If ratified, the treaty will cut the number of European Commissioners to 18,
restrict national vetoes to votes on foreign policy, defence and taxation, and
introduce a double majority voting mechanism (at least 55% of member states
representing no less than 65% of the EU’s population) for the European Council.
The constitution is not only a victory of pragmatism over political vision,
the final compromise also bears the marks of the growing ‘Europhobia’ that many
European leaders are facing at home: in many respects, the document is more
about tying the EU’s hands than developing it further.
The Euroscepticism of voters in large parts of Europe will continue to
influence the constitutional process in 2005, namely by impeding speedy
ratification of the treaty, in particular in the nine countries that are to hold
a referendum on the issue.

The first referenda
The first wave of referenda is likely to take place in Spain, Portugal, the
Netherlands and France, all of which plan to call ballots in the first half of
2005.
A ‘yes’ vote is expected from voters in the Iberian Peninsula; in France,
ratification also seems likely since the main opposition party came out in
favour of the constitution in November 2004. Meanwhile, the Dutch, traditionally
at the forefront of European integration, have cooled towards the EU in recent
years, and an anti-immigration sentiment could precipitate a nationalist
backlash, further affecting support for the constitution.
However, the real tests for the treaty will be the referenda in Poland and the
UK. In the June 2004 European elections, 23 of Poland’s 54 deputies were
anti-EU, while the party best positioned to win the national ballot in October
2005 has yet to define its stance ahead of the referendum, which is likely to be
held at the same time.
In the UK, 69% of voters currently oppose the constitution, making a ‘yes’ vote
in early 2006 unrealistic. As failure to ratify the treaty in one country is
enough to derail it, the process of fortifying the political effectiveness of
the new EU faces turbulent times ahead.
.
Stability
Turning to economic policy, a stable and politically effective EU executive is a
prerequisite for the process of economic reform to progress.
Achieving economic policy objectives on trade, the reform of the Stability
and Growth Pact (SGP) and the Lisbon Agenda of economic and structural reform
represent major challenges for the EU in 2005.
A report on progress towards the EU being the most innovative and competitive
economy in the world by 2010, the premise of the Lisbon Agenda, was sharply
critical of accomplishments so far.
However, the commissioners working under President Jose Manuel Barroso have in
part been selected for their reformist credentials and Barroso, himself a
reformer, appears determined to drive forward the agenda and to challenge
resistance to it. If the political will can be found, we are optimistic that the
EU can start to strengthen its economic performance independently.
.
The future
While promoting the liberalisation of network industries and supporting
greater entrepreneurship and innovation will bolster industrial performance, the
Commission also faces the task of reforming the SGP, which governs members’
fiscal performance.
The Commission must decide whether to restore the use of sanctions against
recalcitrant states following the decision not to fine Germany and France in
2003. Although the Commission has launched the disciplinary excessive deficits
procedure against countries such as Cyprus, Hungary and Slovakia, political
considerations connected with the proposed constitution may assume overriding
importance.
Finally, Cyprus’ refusal to recognise Turkey’s EU membership bid, the
possibility that this will frustrate the start of talks and Ankara’s reluctance
to recognise Cyprus as an EU member provide extra political challenges for 2005.

Source:
Credit Control
Journal
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